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I. ABSTRACT
The nature of identity in the United States lies in the Constitution.1
Perhaps this is due to “veneration” of the document.2 It has also been
argued that the Declaration of Independence holds a seminal role in
the American identity.3
The rift seems to occur with the concept of a “living constitution,”4
whereby the concept of an ever-evolving jurisprudence allows for an
evolving interpretation of the Constitution as society changes. 5
1. Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J. L. & POLITICS 1, 4. (2014). (“To
a large extent, American national identity is currently dependent on the
Constitution.”). Id.n. 7 (2014) (“See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the
Constitutional Subject 76 (2010) (‘In the U.S., the Constitution forms a centerpiece
of national identity rather than a mere adjunct to it.’); Tracy B. Strong, Is the
Political Realm More Encompassing than the Economic Realm?, 137 PUBLIC
CHOICE 439, 448 (2008) (‘We do know that the Constitution is the final arbiter of
what it means to be an American, even if I may not always know, or agree with you,
as to what that means in any particular instance.’).”).
2. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1988) (“‘Veneration’
of the Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of
the American political tradition.”).
3. Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional
Interpretation: A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 138
(1998) (“The concept of a constitutional authority of national ethos suggests that the
Declaration of Independence, as a defining symbol of that ethos, has bearing on
constitutional interpretation. As our understanding of the Declaration evolves, it
rightly shapes the way in which we read our living Constitution. Among
contemporary constitutional interpreters who appear to hold some version of this
view are Charles Black, Justice William Brennan, and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.").
4. See generally Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (discussing the “living constitution” doctrine).
5. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1811–
12 (2007) (“At this point, the separation of powers makes it possible for the Supreme
Court to remember the achievements of the recent past, and integrate them into our
evolving constitutional legacy.”) "The idea of a living constitution is premised upon
the idea that constitutions are, in their barest form, organisms. Lawyers, judges and
political scientists alike have long described constitutions in organic terms. More
explicitly, the United States Constitution has been "born," it has been "nurtured,"
and it has the ability to "grow" with society. If constitutions have these
characteristics, then there must be some process that drives them to change.
Professor Scott Dodson has argued that the metaphor of a living constitution--which
includes many allusions to biological theories of evolution--may not be entirely
accurate, at least not when described in terms of Darwinian natural selection. In
natural selection based change, evolution occurs in a two-step process. First, genetic
variation occurs, with neither direction nor purpose, within individual organisms. In
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This rift can be demonstrated by the world of J.R.R. Tolkien. In
The Lord of the Rings and Silmarillion, the various languages of
groups of Middle Earth represent and have distinct portrayals of
attributes.6 The elves speaking Sindarin and Quenya seek beautiful
things,7 the orcs are former elves that have been corrupted in their
language, the dwarves are logical in their Khuzdul language, etc.
However, the natures of the languages are subject to change. This is
exemplified when Melkor, one of the original beings, created by Eru
Ilúvatar (the original being), turns dark when the original singing—

the second step, the natural environment exerts pressures on the variants, and those
with traits best designed to withstand those pressures survive and reproduce more
copies of their traits." Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and The Living
Constitution, 42 DAYTON L. REV. 257, 259 (2017).
See.Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2043
(2012) (reviewing JACK. M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 267 (2011) (“Instead
[living constitutionalism] describes the processes by which constitutional change
occurs in all of the different branches of government and in civil society, and it
explains why these processes, in the long run, promote the democratic legitimacy of
the system as a whole. Rather than identifying the living Constitution with commonlaw decision making, I argue that the living Constitution is the product of
constitutional construction by all branches of government over time. Some of this
construction might be described as common-law decision making - by federal and
state courts, by administrative agencies, and by executive officials. But this account
does not tell us very much, for it simply describes change by analogy to the ancient
practices of British courts without attempting to explain the engines of change in
the various institutions of government and civil society. Jack M. Balkin,
Symposium, Originalism and Living Constitutionalism: A Symposium on Jack
Balkin's Living Originalism and David Strauss's The Living Constitution: Panelist
Papers: The Roots of The Living Constitution, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1129, 1155 (2012)”).
6. “Other constructed languages are artistic in nature, intended to exist only
in an imaginary space. These constructed languages can provide unique depth and
richness to a fictional world. Author John Ronald Reuel ("J.R.R.") Tolkien
developed multiple detailed languages for the races (elves, dwarves, ents, orcs, etc.)
of Middle Earth in his fantasy novels.” Michael Adelman, Constructed Languages
and Copyright: A Brief History and Proposal for Divorce, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
543, 547-548 (2014).
Indeed, the art as a whole of Tolkien’s works seems most representative of the
rifts in constitutional interpretation. “As one reader described, ‘[r]eading Tolkien's
major works is like looking at a painting in which a beautiful garden is glimpsed in
the background, and then discovering that the garden actually exists, having been
planted by the artist before the picture was painted.’” Id.
7. “After Tolkien laid out the initial vocabulary and structure of Elvish
languages such as Quenya and Sindarin, fans studied and expanded the languages
in order to write their own works in Tolkien's constructed tongues.” Rachel Scall,
Emoji as Language and Their Place Outside American Copyright Law, 5 N.Y.U. J.
OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 381, 399 (2016).
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evidently before the creation of language—of the Ainur 8 becomes
dissonant with Melkor’s choice to sing differently.9
Natural law has been compared to originalism in the sense that the
two have overlapping elements.10 Again, it may be fair to compare
natural law to the musical order set by Eru Ilúvatar. If this premise is
accepted that natural law is originalism, 11 the order set by Eru
Ilúvatar, then the dissonance caused by Melkor can arguably be the
concept of a living constitution—or at least that the two have
overlapping elements.12
This is not a critique of living constitutionalism and similar
theories of constitutional interpretation. But, rather, an interpretation
of how the two theories could be metaphors of how constitutional
8. “In writing The Lord of the Rings and The Silmarillion, J. R. R. Tolkien
created Middle-earth: its geography, peoples, languages, histories, and myths.
Among the tales of patriarchs and the legends of great heroes, Tolkien has included
a complex creation myth, ‘Ainulindalë: The Music of the Ainur," which develops
through three separate stages: the Great Music, the Vision, and Eä.’” Elizabeth A.
Whittingham, The Mythology of the "Ainulindalë": Tolkien's Creation of Hope, 9 J.
FANTASTIC ARTS 212, 212-13 (1998).
Cf. "His symphonists, the Ainur, are clearly individual avatars of the various
aspects of his own aesthetic fecundity. As composer/director, Ilúvatar allows each
musician room to improvise, reserving to himself the fi- nal touches which render
the whole harmonious within the composer's con- ception. The resulting image of
the nature of being exploits the natural tension between form and invention which
Igor Stravinsky has hailed as the matrix of creative art, and which reflects at the
same time an essential paradox of Western theology: ‘free will’ versus the deity's
‘foreknowledge,’ or ‘freedom versus necessity’ in Chaucer's terms (B 4426-4440)."
Robert A. Collins, "Ainulindale": Tolkien's Commitment to an Aesthetic Ontology,
11 J. FANTASTIC ARTS 257 (2000).
See J.R.R. Tolken, 17 PARMA ELDALAMBERON WORDS, PHRASES AND
PASSAGES (for a definition, "The Ainur only used of the Spirits before Creation, or
of those unnamed who are not concerned with it.").
9. Matthew R. Bardowell, J.R.R. Tolkien's Creative Ethic and ITs Finnish
Analogues, 20 J. FANTASTIC ARTS 91, 98-100 (2009).
10. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism-or Why Justice Scalia
(Almost) Gets It Right, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 649 (1997) (“Natural law
is an inescapable and important element of originalism, and no sincere originalist
can omit the inquiry.”).
11. However, this may not be true. Cf. André Leduc, The Ontological
Foundations of the Debate Over Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 288
(2015). (“Natural law originalism warrants a brief separate analysis of its ontology
and philosophy of language. Natural law originalism carries its philosophical
commitments openly. Justice Thomas and Randy Barnett provide perhaps the
clearest statements of natural law originalism. Natural law originalism appears
paradoxical.”).
12. However, it is arguable that they were created by Eru Ilúvatar at the same
time men were created.
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interpretation as seen through literary—that is myths existing in an
inception of literature, such as, the myth of The Silmarillion set within
the works of Tolkien—lenses.13 Indeed, for purposes of this analysis:
living constitutionalism and originalism could be flipped, arguably.
This deviation from Eru Ilúvatar’s original plan does not have to
necessarily result negatively. There are others who fall out of line with
the original conception of Eru Ilúvatar, such as “men” who are
endowed with the gift of a short life and thus are industrious and
creative. Arguably, it could also be extended to the world of Hobbits
who are evidently related to men—but their origin story is never
clearly delineated in any of Tolkien’s writings.
Thus, this shows that the story of the Silmarillion primarily and in
part The Lord of the Rings exemplifies rifts of originalism and living
constitution doctrines. These perhaps are not just relevant for
Constitutional interpretation purposes.
II. NATURAL LAW
Legal theorist John Finnis describes the basis of natural law as
being a “complete community.” 14 This complete community
transcends all jurisdictions.15 Finnis identifies freedom and equality
as a key element to natural law.16 Natural theories argue that moral

13. Such myths exist in the backdrop of other stories, such as Harry Potter
through Grindelwald or even Tom Marvollo Riddle’s history can be seen as a myth
analogous to the stories set forth in The Silmarillion.
14. Barry E. Moscowitz, Natural Law and Land Use Regulation: A Case
Analysis, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 39, 44 n.17 (“Finnis identifies four unifying
relationships (or ‘orders’) of human community: (1) physical and biological unity;
(2) unity of intelligence in its capacities, its workings, and its product, knowledge;
(3) cultural unity of shared language, common technology, common technique,
common capital stock, and so on; and (4) unity of common action. J. Finnis, Natural
Law and Natural Rights 136-138 (1980). Finnis's analysis, however, primarily
concerns community in the fourth order — unity of common action. Id. at 138.”).
15. Id. at 44 n.22 (The concept of a total community transcending all
jurisdictions comes from Finnis’s term of a poelis. “Finnis defines a poelis as the
territorial state, ‘political community’ or ‘body politic’ that today claims to be
complete and self-sufficient, and which Aristotle declared was the paradigmatic
form of complete and self-sufficient community for securing the all-around good of
its members.”).
16. Christopher Tollefsen, Freedom and Equality in Market Exchange: Some
Natural Law Reflections, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2010) (“Both freedom
and equality, properly understood, are essential to the natural law account of the
market as presented by its greatest proponent, St. Thomas Aquinas.”), See JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 127 n.V.1 (2nd ed. 2011).
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truths—leading to the creation of laws—can not only come from
divine revelation, but also from reasoned reflection.17
There have been key critiques to natural law—especially from
H.L.A. Hart—that argued that natural law has a paradoxical basis in
sociological principles of society. 18 Finnis and other natural law
theorists have argued that application of Hart’s method is misguided
because it is not social norms that drive laws, but rather laws are
present—in a natural law paradigm—“to serve the common good.”19
III. ORIGINALISM
Originalism is the concept of gaining an understanding of the law
from the time it was passed into law.20
17. Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 181
(2008) (“They assert, with St. Paul, that there is a law ‘written [on the] hearts’ even
of the Gentiles who did not know the law of Moses—a law the knowledge of which
is sufficient for moral accountability.”), See Romans 2:15 (New International
Version).
18. George, supra, note 7, at 196 n.41 (“Even before the appearance of The
Concept of Law, Hart had sternly repudiated natural law theory, arguing that ‘in all
its protean guises’ natural law theory relies on the implausible descriptive
sociological claim ‘that human beings are equally devoted to and united in their
conception of aims (the pursuit of knowledge, justice to their fellow men) other than
that of survival.’ H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 623 (1958). Of course, Hart was correct that such a claim is
utterly implausible. The trouble is that no natural law theorist (or anyone else, so far
as I am aware) has ever asserted any such thing. As John Finnis has remarked in
criticizing Hart's attribution of the claim to natural law theorists, ‘[c]ertainly the
classical theorists of natural law all took for granted, and often enough bluntly
asserted, that human beings are not all equally devoted to the pursuit of knowledge
or justice, and are far from united in their conception of what constitutes worthwhile
knowledge or a demand of justice.’ Finnis, supra note 12, at 29.”).
19. Id. at 196.
20. “The term 'originalism' has been most commonly used since the middle
1980s and was apparently coined by Paul Brest in The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980). Earlier discussions often
used the term 'interpretivism' to denote theories that sought to derive meaning from
the constitutional text alone ('textualism'), or from the intentions of the originators
('intentionalism'). See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980) ('interpretivism'); Thomas Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 703, 706 (1975) ('interpretive
model'); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) ('intentionalism'). Current discussions have tended to
reject the labels 'interpretivism,' which often embraces nonoriginalist textualism,
and 'intentionalism,' which suggests reliance on subjective intentions rather than
objective meaning. See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
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Originalism encompasses two terms: original meaning and
original intent. 21 Original meaning invokes the concept of what a
reasonable speaker of English would have understood the terms to
mean at the time the law was adopted.22 Original intent invokes the
concept of the goals, objectives, or purposes at the time. 23 Ronald
Dworkin points out that the main difference between the two is that
original meaning is “[W]hat some officials intended to say in enacting
the language they used, and what they intended—or expected or
hoped—would be the consequences of their saying it.”24 The sources
for originalism includes the text of the law, contemporary dictionaries,
legislative records, subsequent interpretations by courts of the law,
and comparison of the meaning in different circumstances.25
The roots and premises of originalism come from the assumption
that the Constitution grants the government the right to govern:
This original and supreme will organizes the
government, and assigns, to different departments,
their respective powers. It may either stop here; or
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those
departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter
description. The powers of the legislature are defined,
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken,
CONSTITUTION 146 n.3 (1992); Richard B. Saphire, Enough About Originalism, 15
N. KY. L. REV. 513, 515 n.7 (1988).” Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 1034 n.1 (1998).
21. “Strong originalism, as I will use the term, comprises two distinct subsets.
Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, whatever
may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers' intent, ratifiers'
understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target
or touchstone. Call this subtype of strong originalism "exclusive originalism." It can
be distinguished from a sibling view that is a shade less strong - viz., that interpreters
must accord original meaning (or intent or understanding) lexical priority when
interpreting the Constitution but may search for other forms of meaning
(contemporary meaning, best meaning, etc.) when the original meaning cannot be
ascertained with sufficient confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant of
strong originalism "lexical originalism."” Mitchel N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk,
84 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 10 (2009).
22. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
CHI. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2001).
23. Id.
24. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 115, 116 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton 1997).
25. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 110-46.
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or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at
any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?
The distinction, between a government with limited
and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do
not confine the persons on whom they are imposed,
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal
obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested,
that the constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act.26
This is the basis of jurisprudence and ability for the judicial
department to say what the law is within the context of the other
branches of government.27
IV. CONNECTION OF NATURAL LAW AND ORIGINALISM
Justice Scalia wrote “The prevailing image of the common law
was that of a preexisting body of rules, uniform throughout the nation
. . . that judges merely ‘discovered’ rather than created.”28 This comes
from the concept that natural law and written law were the same.29
Even “[T]he Federalists had expressly argued that the entire Bill of
Rights was redundant” because “natural and customary rights
[existed] independent of any textual enumeration.”30
Today, the “Legal Positivist and Legal Realist movements that
Justice Holmes helped shape one hundred years ago fundamentally
reoriented things,” to lead us away from the idea that natural law and
the written law are the same.31

26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803).
27. See generally. Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, A Structural Etiology
of the U.S. Constitution, 43 J. LEGIS. 122 (2016). Cf. Charles Edward Andrew
Lincoln IV, Hegelian Dialectical Analysis of U.S. Voting Laws, 42 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 87, 91 (2017).
28. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 10.
29. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Natural Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1541 (2011).
30. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment,
58 EMORY L.J. 585, 667 (2009).
31. Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 1542.
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Arguably originalism is based on the concept of a social contract
whereby the basis of natural law is presumed. 32 The substantial
similarity between natural law and originalism has been raised
questions of the choice between natural law and positive law. 33
Although originalism can come in the form of positive law originalism
and natural law originalism.34 Still, the premise is that originalism is
based in natural law—the nature of human activity.
V. LIVING CONSTITUTION
A. The Story and Rifts in the Silmarillion
The first chapter of the Silmarillion is The Silmarillion,
Ainulindalë (Quenya for “Music of the Ainur”) recounts the creation
story of Tolkien’s mythology. The story begins with Eru Ilúvatar
creating the world of Eä (the pre-historical worlds to The Lord of the
Rings Trilogy). The Ainur35 were created by Ilúvatar as “children of
Ilúvatar’s thought.” The Ainur are the immortal spirits that These
immortal beings sing—either alone or in a group—leading to a “great”
plan for them to sing in a harmonic symphony. A caveat is that
although the Ainur are created by Ilúvatar and embody his thoughts,
they have free will to help him with his great plan of “unfolding a
history whose vastness and majesty had never been equaled.” Among
these original fifteen Ainur, Ilúvatar created Melkor who had the
“greatest power and knowledge” compared to the others. Melkor
broke with the harmony of the other Ainur to develop his own music.
Some of the other Ainur also joined Melkor. Melkor breaking off from
32. “As it turns out, however, the major forms of originalism are at worst
unsuccessful or unnecessary in validating the constitutional text, and at best
dependent upon rival contractualist views, which are in turn dependent upon rival
natural law or natural rights views.” R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy
Among Constitutional Theories, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141, 170 (2004). (footnote
omitted)
33. André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the Debate
About Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613, 616 (2016). See JULES L. COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY, 125-26 (2001). (describing the opposition of natural law and positive law
theory in the context of a contemporary defense of legal positivism).
34. See LeDuc, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. at 616.
35. Ainur is a Quenya name comes from the Elvish root ayan- "revere, treat
with awe"; Quenya is a fictional language devised by J. R. R. Tolkien and used by
the Elves in his legendarium. J.R.R. Tolkien, Parma Eldalamberon 17: Words,
Phrases & Passages in Various Tongues in The Lord of the Rings (Christopher
Gilson ed., 2007), at 149.
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Ilúvatar causes rifts in Ainur. It should be noted that the themes
Melkor proposed of vanity and selfishness become “evil” in the
Tolkien legendarium.
Ultimately, Ilúvatar, realizing his plan has not succeeded, leaves
the Ainur and Melkor. At the end of the Void, 36 Ilúvatar takes the
Ainur to see the arrival of the Children of Ilúvatar—the Elves and
Men. After Melkor’s disruption, Ilúvatar gives the Ainur a choice of
either staying with him in the Timeless Halls or going to the world
created by their music.
Many of the Ainur descended into Arda—the physical location of
the world of the Silmarillion and Lord of the Rings—to live with the
children of Ilúvatar. Among them was Melkor, who wished and
desired to rule Arda. The Ainur were divided into two groups: the
more powerful—Valar—and the less powerful—the Maiar.
In the physical creation of Arda, the followers of Eru Ilúvatar each
dealt with Melkor warping Arda for his own purpose. However, the
Valar were eventually successful in forcing Melkor out of Arda. At
this point in the creation story in The Silmarillion, the world of Arda
was initially flat and without light. The Ainur created two lamps out
of the misty light found throughout Arda. One lamp was placed in the
north and one in the south to illuminate Arda. Arda was surrounded
by an encircling sea and beyond that was the “walls of night.” In the
center of Arda was the Isle of Ormarin which is where the Ainur lived.
With the help of several Maiar, Melkor catastrophically destroyed the
two lamps of light substantially changing Arda.
The destruction of the lamps created four continents. Middle Earth
was in the middle of these continents. The Ainur went to live on the
western continent of Aman where Valinor was located. Valinor is the
land in the west and is also known as the “undying lands.” However,
subsequent to the movement of the Ainur into the western continent
of Aman where the Valinor was located, Yavanna Kementári, the
Queen of Earth—the Giver of Fruits—sang into existence two
enormous light bearing trees: Telperion the Silver Tree and Laurelin
the Golden Tree. However, these trees were only on Aman.
Subsequent to Yavanna’s creation, the children of Ilúvatar—the
Elves—awoke on the shores of Middle Earth. Melkor quickly became
36. For non-readers of The Silmarillion but for those familiar with The Lord of
the Rings, Tom Bombadil references the Void in the chapter “"Fog on the Barrowdowns.” He states, “"Lost and forgotten be, darker than the darkness, Where gates
stand forever shut, till the World is mended.” In The Silmarillion, the Void is
generally the place—or lack thereof—beyond Arda that existed before Ilúvatar’s
creation.
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aware of the Elves and sent evil spirits to corrupt them. As a result of
Melkor’s corruption of the Elves, one of the Valar, named Oromë,
summoned and led a portion of elves to Valinor—this event was
known as the Sundering of the Elves. Following Oromë’s summoning
of a portion of the elves, the elves were effectively divided into two
groups at this point. Thus, this leading to the distinction of the two
elvish languages, Quenya and Sindarin.
VI. HOW THE SILMARILLION CAN EXEMPLIFY RIFTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Assuming for argument that common law is the musical of
harmony of Eru Ilúvatar which the Ainur manifested in various
ways. 37 Ilúvatar’s song created Arda, the Ainur, and Melkor.
Arguably, even Tom Bombadil is a personification of the music
harmony.38 Means of interpretation—such as stare decisis—are the
37. Indeed, the idea of comparing common law to music and art is not a novel
idea. “[T]he lawyer was best compared to the composer: ‘[P]erhaps, it may more
justly be likened to a complicated piece of music, wherein a single false note may
destroy the entire harmony of the performance.’ Id. Either way, as painter or
composer, the lawyer was playing a critical role in the common-law proceedings,
crafting them virtually from scratch in a solo performance that, at its best, could rise
to virtuoso proportions.” John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The
Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 825, 866 (1999).
See further for a discussion generally of common law being seen as a harmony
like architecture even in Blackstone’s writings, “When Blackstone talked about
reforming the Common Law, he used two terms: ‘improvement’ and ‘perfection.’
To his eighteenth-century readers, both would be indicative of the idea that, through
experience and observation, law makers could induce first principles that then could
be referred to in order to ‘improve’ the Common Law over time. As the Common
Law was improved, it would become more perfect; in other words, it would
increasingly reflect the order, beauty, and harmony of the natural law. Blackstone
articulated the improvement and perfection of the Common Law in terms of history
and architecture.” Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of The Pursuit of Happiness, 7
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 195, 217-218. (2015).
38. Such a statement is a conjecture. “Second, Tom's basic song is structurally
related to Legolas' "Song of the Sea" (Rings, 3:234-35), suggesting the possibility
that Tom's is a corruption of an original piece of music from the Uttermost West
common to both. Third, Tom's songs, although seemingly comic and nonsensical,
have power in them to control individual elements and things in the forest. When
told that Old Man Willow is the cause of the Hobbits' problems, Tom replies, "That
can soon be mended. I know the tune for him" (Ibid., 1:131), which I suggest means
something like, "Don't worry. I have the plans for that thing and can fix it right
away." This is the kind of knowledge that a Vala, who sang the Music, would likely
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ways of coming to decisions using what laws and statutes already
exist.39
The already laid down statutes, previously decided common law,
and precedent can all be construed as analogous to the songs of
Harmony, Creation, and Awakening, because common law is the basis
for which future decisions are made. Likewise, the songs of Harmony,
Creation, and Awakening are the beginning formulations for the rest
of the stories in the Tolkien Legendarium from which the stories are
built from.40 These songs are the initial stepping stone in the creation
of the world of Arda which in turn created the Elves, Men, Dwarves,
etc.41 Following their creation, the various beings were allowed to do
what they wished in the lands.
Likewise, the precedent, Constitution, and statutes laid down give
us the choice of how to decide how to interpret law. Although some
would argue that strict textualism—for example—does not give us a
choice, we still have the options of which precedent to use.
Analogous to the interpretative practices of the Constitution, the
original Ainur who were all united at once, the concept of natural law
and positive law were united at the beginning of the nation. This was
so much so that the Federalists argued the Bill of Rights would be
redundant, because the rights were already enshrined even if not
written. 42 But as time progressed, Melkor caused dissonance and
have, and singing would be the natural way to apply it.” Hargrove, Gene, Who is
Tom Bombadil? Mythlore: A Journal of JRR Tolkien, CS Lewis, Charles Williams,
and
Mythopoeic
Literature
13.1
(1986):
3.
https://dc.swosu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1604&context=mythlore
39. As a casual argument against the harmony of common law stare decisis,
“Judge Shahabuddeen's struggle for harmony of opinions is also apparent when he
addresses the relationship between stare decisis and the law-creating power of the
Court.” Olav A. Haazen, Book Review, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 587, 596 (1997).
40. “A pre-history of the fantastic realm of Tolkien’s stories from before
creation to the age in which the Lord of the Rings occurs. J.R.R. Tolkien, The
Silmarillion (1977).” Donald R. McConnell, The Nature in Natural Law, 2 Liberty
U.L. Rev. 797, 846 (2008).
41. “Eru, whom the Eldar call Ilúvatar, then gives the Ainur a more wonderful
and complex theme than any they have imagined and wills them to make together a
Great Music, the beginning of the creation process.” Elizabeth A. Wittingham, The
Mythology of the "Ainulindalë": Tolkien's Creation of Hope, Journal of the Fantastic
in the Arts, Vol. 9, No. 3 (35), The Tolkien Issue (1998), pp. 212-228.
42. Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 1541 n.5 (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 667 (2009)
(noting that “the Federalists had expressly argued that the entire Bill of Rights was
redundant” because “natural and customary rights [existed] independent of any
textual enumeration”)).
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some of the Ainur split from the original goal of Eru Ilúvatar’s
symphony. Likewise, concepts of positive and natural law sprang up
as dichotomies—yet with a uniquely similar origin.
A possible explanation for the dichotomies in constitutional
interpretation exists by analogy to the different beings in Lord of the
Rings:
A curious aspect of the Tolkien fantasy world is the
coexistence of different kinds of intelligent beings.
There are not only human beings like ourselves, but
hobbits, elves, dwarves, orcs, and trolls, to name only
the major groups. Each has their own set of defining
characteristics. If you read Tolkien's Silmarillion, or
the appendices to his books, you can learn more about
the origins of the different peoples and their respective
places in the created order. You could say each group
has their own “nature.” Orcs are odd in this regard,
however. Their ancestors were once elves, bright
beautiful beings capable of great art, creativity, and
culture, but also susceptible to hubris, pride, despair,
and other sins common to human beings. Nonetheless,
despite some major instances of elvish misconduct,
you could say that as a whole the elves are “on the side
of the angels.” At one point, however, the “dark
powers” of Middle Earth captured some elves in the
distant past and altered them, thorough some occult
science, to produce the orcs. The orcs are a race of
vicious implacable evil doers. They exhibit cruelty,
lust of all kinds, hate, brutality, and recklessness.
Physically and spiritually ugly, the orcs live only to
destroy and subjugate. They do not even act honorably
to each other, engaging in betrayal, cannibalism, and
abuse of self and other orcs.43 (footnotes omitted)
The story of the Lord of the Rings, as exhibited in the appendices,
indicates that a group of beings fell from the status of the Elves to

43. Donald R. McConnell, The Nature in Natural Law, 2 LIBERTY U.L. REV.
797, 798–99 (2008).
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Orcs.44 The dichotomy in nature between Orcs and Elves—as well as
the other beings: hobbits, humans, etc.—exists, because:
the orcs are very evil by nature that we feel comfortable
with their utter defeat. When men and hobbits go bad,
by contrast, we feel a pang of sympathy. Not because
they succumbed to their inherited traits, but because we
really expect better things of them. We judge all by a
standard other than average or typical human behavior.
We judge conduct, both human and orc, by the Natural
Law.45

44. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE SILMARILLION 50 (1977).
45. McConnell, supra note 41, at 801.
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Perhaps the nature to examine is not the nature of the beings, but
the teleological46 goal of the creator of the beings.47 This could have
theological and ontological implications if taken to a priori logical
conclusions; meaning, it is perhaps not important to look at the nature
of the Elves or the Orcs but the nature of Eru Ilúvatar. By analogy, it
is perhaps not relevant to always examine the teleological ends of each
method of constitutional interpretation, but rather the teleological
ends of the Constitution itself.

46. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial
Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 298 fn. 19 (2000) (“By teleological, I mean an
interpretation that emphasizes Aristotle's tendency to explain things primarily with
respect to a telos or final end (i.e., with respect to a state of affairs or characteristic
of reality to be pursued). Cf. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD: MODERN
MORAL THEORY AND THE NECESSITY OF GOD 61 (1990) (‘[A] teleological ethic is
one in which the distinction between moral and immoral action as such is identified
by reference to one or more states of affairs or characteristics of existence to be
affirmed or pursued.’). For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits a
normative ethic grounded on a teleological principle--a principle that grounds moral
claims in a telos (end or goal). By contrast, Kant proposes a radically
nonteleological or deontological principle--the categorical imperative. Rather than
identifying a state of affairs that should be pursued (a telos), Kant claims that
morality must be cleansed of everything empirical by pure practical reason. See
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 56 (H.J. Paton
trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). Kant proposes the science of morality to purify
ordinary practical reason (the will) of these empirical influences (ends) so that duty
may become the ground of action. In addition, Kant argues that the ‘supreme moral
principle’ is categorical or rationally necessary. Moreover, ‘if freedom of the will is
presupposed, morality, together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the
concept of freedom.’ Id. at 115.”). See David Roochnik, Michael Sandel's NeoAristotelianism, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (2011). (“A brief digression: if the
above is accurate, then the title of Sandel's book, The Case Against Perfection, is
misleading. For Aristotle the ‘perfect,’ which translates the Greek teleion (derived
from telos) is synonymous with the ‘complete.’ This concept requires that of a limit,
an end. As Aristotle puts it, ‘nothing is complete unless it has a telos. And a telos is
a limit.’ A mature, healthy, flourishing animal, for example, is a complete (teleion)
set of well-functioning and well-coordinated parts. But teleion, like the English
‘perfect,’ also has a second, normative, sense. What is ‘perfect’ is not only complete
or that from which nothing is absent but it is also maximally good and ‘cannot be
exceeded in its kind. For example, a perfect doctor or flutist are those who,
according to the form of the excellence that belongs to them, lack nothing.’ In short,
the very notion of Aristotelian perfection (in both its senses) requires a limit. A
doctor can be perfect because ‘being a doctor’ is a determinate condition that can be
attained. But limit is precisely what is missing in the Promethean project of genetic
engineering, which Sandel characterizes as “a boundless bid for mastery and
dominion.’”).
47. See McConnell, supra note 41, at 844.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Thus far, this article has attempted to show that the story of the
Silmarillion primarily and in part The Lord of the Rings can exemplify
rifts of originalism and living constitutional doctrines. These perhaps
are not just relevant for U.S. constitutional interpretation purposes.
The nature of identity in the U.S. lies in the Constitution. Perhaps
this is due to “veneration” of the document.48 It has also been argued
that the Declaration of Independence holds a seminal role in the
American identity.
The rift seems to occur with the concept of a “living constitution,”
whereby the concept of an ever-evolving jurisprudence allows for an
evolving interpretation of the Constitution as society changes.49
This rift is demonstrated by the world of J.R.R. Tolkien. In The
Lord of the Rings and Silmarillion, the various beings of Middle Earth
have distinct natures. The elves seek beautiful things, the orcs are
former elves that have been corrupted, the dwarves are logical, etc.
However, their natures are subject to change. This is exemplified
when Melkor, one of the original beings created by Eru Ilúvatar (the
original being), turns dark when the original singing of the Ainur
becomes dissonant with Melkor’s choice to sing differently.
Natural law has been compared to originalism.50 Again, it may be
fair to compare natural law to the order set by Eru Ilúvatar. If this
premise is accepted, that natural law is originalism, the order set by
Eru Ilúvatar, then the dissonance caused by Melkor can arguably be
the concept of a living constitution.
This deviation from Eru Ilúvatar’s original plan does not have to
necessarily be negative. There are others who fall out of line with the
original conception of Eru Ilúvatar, such as men who are endowed
with the gift of a short life and thus are industrious and creative.
Arguably, it could also be extended to the world of Hobbits who are
evidently related to men—but their origin story is never clearly
delineated in any of Tolkien’s writings.
48. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 11 (“‘Veneration’ of the Constitution has
become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the American political
tradition.”).
49. See Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 3, at 1811–12 (“At this
point, the separation of powers makes it possible for the Supreme Court to remember
the achievements of the recent past, and integrate them into our evolving
constitutional legacy.”).
50. Kmiec, supra note 11, at 649 (“Natural law is an inescapable and important
element of originalism, and no sincere originalist can omit the inquiry.”).
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